After a state of war, natural disasters, or state collapse, procurement doesn’t stop, it simply vanishes from sight. Traditional supply chains give way to what can only be described as “ghost systems”: invisible, improvised networks that operate where governance is weak, infrastructure is shattered, and formal markets are non-existent. Welcome to procurement in fragile states.
When Systems Fail, Networks Rise
In high-stakes negotiations, procurement professionals are not just selecting goods or services, they’re Procurement in post-conflict or disaster-affected zones often begins not with a call for tenders, but with a whisper in a market alley or a handshake at a border. The formal procurement mechanisms typical in stable economies, competitive bidding, transparent frameworks, supplier due diligence, are often impossible in these environments. In their place rise informal, trust-based systems where relationships matter more than documentation.
Local buyers, including humanitarian logisticians, frequently work with informal vendors: small transporters, community-based suppliers, or regional traders who can move goods through complex terrain or past militias and checkpoints. These actors don’t sign contracts, they promise delivery.
This form of decentralised procurement is fraught with risks: corruption, diversion, and lack of accountability. Yet in many cases, it’s the only thing that works.
The UN and the Rise of Hybrid Procurement Models
NOrganisations like the United Nations and large NGOs play a critical role in bridging the gap between informal systems and institutional requirements. Agencies such as the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have developed hybrid procurement models that combine formal procurement policy with flexible, field-driven delivery mechanisms.
In Somalia, the WFP developed a local procurement initiative to source food from regional markets. By buying locally, they shortened supply chains, supported local economies, and navigated fragile security conditions more effectively. However, it also required exceptional vetting and oversight capacity in a region with limited data or regulatory support.
UNOPS, similarly, has been instrumental in rebuilding health infrastructure in Syria by contracting local construction firms, often informal groups that emerged in the power vacuum of the war. These “local partnerships” allowed critical rebuilding to begin years before the return of formal governance structures.
Haiti: Improvisation in the Rubble
After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the country became a live case study of procurement under duress. The disaster wiped out roads, ports, and critical institutions. Humanitarian organisations had to rely heavily on local market actors and diaspora networks.
In the absence of a functioning central government, NGOs worked with community leaders and informal distributors to procure tents, medicine, water, and food. While many supplies were airlifted in, the bulk of distribution depended on navigating informal logistics networks. In some cases, UN peacekeepers provided convoy protection to ensure delivery of aid.
Haiti also saw the emergence of “parallel supply chains”—one operated by large agencies with international suppliers, and another by local actors using regional inputs. Over time, efforts were made to integrate both, with mixed success. The key lesson: procurement must not only deliver goods, but also adapt to the social and political fabric of its environment.
Procurement in Syria: Rebuilding Through Shadows
Syria offers a particularly complex example. After years of conflict, the procurement landscape is fragmented across zones controlled by different actors, state forces, opposition groups, Kurdish authorities, and external powers. In such a divided context, procurement is not just about logistics, but geopolitics.
UN agencies and NGOs operating in northern Syria have often relied on cross-border aid—supplies entering from Turkey, Iraq, or Jordan. In many cases, they work with local councils or community-based organisations to procure building materials, fuel, or medical equipment. These groups serve as “informal procurement offices,” navigating the local terrain far more effectively than any external contractor could.
However, the lack of standardised oversight has led to accusations of diversion and exploitation. The procurement officer in such a zone must be part logistician, part diplomat, and part detective.
Toward a New Procurement Logic
What these examples show is that procurement in fragile states can’t be judged by the standards of stable environments. Success isn’t just measured by lowest cost or most compliant supplier—it’s measured by impact, speed, and survival.
“Adaptive procurement” is emerging as a new paradigm. It requires balancing risk and necessity, improvising within ethical boundaries, and rethinking value for money. It also requires strategic alliances between formal institutions and informal actors.
Sources:
UNOPS (2023). Procurement in Crisis: Adaptive Approaches in Fragile States. https://www.unops.org/
WFP Somalia Case Study. (2021). Local Procurement in Fragile Settings. https://www.wfp.org/
ALNAP & ODI (2011). The State of the Humanitarian System: Haiti Earthquake Response. https://sohs.alnap.org/
Syria Cross-Border Operations Report, UNOCHA (2022). https://www.unocha.org/
